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Abstract: The aim of this article is to present the most frequently discussed actions 
undertaken by Chancellor Angela Merkel in order to stop the increased immigration of 
Syrians to Germany. The solutions proposed by Merkel are shown in the context of the 
reactions they triggered in CDU and CSU members. The policy of the Chancellor, and 
both German Christian Democratic parties and their representatives, has been presented 
in the context of critical discussions regarding the political costs associated with the 
admission of so many foreigners. The article analyzes, among other things, the issues 
regarding the position of Angela Merkel on the German political scene and the influence 
of the Willkommenspolitik on the results of the Bundestag elections in 2017.
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The wave of immigrants2 from war-ridden Syria who in 2015 entered the European Union, triggering a migration crisis, has resulted in 
1 Co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union.
The European Commission support for the production of this scientific article  does 
not constitute an endorsement of the contents which reflects the views only of the 
authors, and the Commission cannot be held responsible for any use which may be 
made of the information contained therein.
2 The author deliberately uses the broader term ‘immigrant’ instead of ‘refugee’ 
because not all the immigrants who started arriving in Germany in 2015 are eligible 
for the status of refugee. There are four forms of protection in Germany: political 
asylum granted on the basis of German Basic Law, refugee status following from 
the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1951, subsidiary protection as stipulated 
in the Law on Asylum, and Duldung (Tolerated Stay Permit that is issued for for-
eigners who are unable to travel, or to return to their country of destination due to 
the situation there; the permit remains valid until the return of a given person be-
comes feasible). According to Basic Law, persons persecuted on political grounds 
have the right to asylum (Ustawa zasadnicza, Art. 16(a)(1), 1997, p. 87). Pursuant to 
Art. 1 of the 1951 Geneva Convention, the term ‘refugee’ applies to any person who 
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divisions and tensions between both EU member states and politicians 
from different political parties within individual countries. The situation 
in Germany was similar, where the discussion between the advocates of 
the ‘open-door’ policy (Ger.: Willkommenspolitik) and the proponents of 
curbing the mass influx of migrants was held between different political 
parties, and inside these parties. It seems of particular interest to ana-
lyze the standpoints taken by the representatives of the German Christian 
Democrats – members of the Christian Democratic Union (Ger.: Chris-
tlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands – CDU) and the Christian Social 
Union (Ger.: Christlich-Soziale Union – CSU). There are several reasons 
for this. Firstly, the CDU is chaired by Angela Merkel, who is believed to 
be the main initiator and the biggest supporter of admitting immigrants 
and refugees from Syria. As German Chancellor, she determines and is 
responsible for the guidelines of Germany’s policy. Her other tasks also 
involve conducting the proceedings of the federal government (Ustawa 
zasadnicza, Art. 65, p. 143).3 Secondly, over the period concerned, the 
Christian Democrats formed the federal government in Germany and held 
the majority of seats in the Bundestag – 311 seats after the 2013 elections, 
when they garnered 41.5% of the votes, and 246 seats (33% of votes) after 
the 2017 elections (Bundestagswahl 2017…, 2017); this was significant 
in view of Germany’s immigration and refugee policy. Thirdly, Christian-
is outside the country of his nationality, citizenship, or habitual residence; who ow-
ing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion or, owing to such fear 
is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country (Convention Relating 
to the Status of Refugees, Art. 1, 1991, p. 2). Immigrants who have been refused the 
status of refugees can be granted subsidiary protection. Pursuant to Section 4 of the 
German Asylum Act, “(1) A foreigner shall be eligible for subsidiary protection if he 
has shown substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering 
serious harm in his country of origin. Serious harm consists of: (1) death penalty or 
execution, (2) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, or (3) serious 
and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence 
in situations of international or internal armed conflict” (Asylgesetz in der Fassung…, 
Unterabschnitt 2 Internationaler Schutz § 4 Subsidiärer Schutz, 2017).
3 The strong legal and political position of the Chancellor is evidenced, among 
other things, by the fact that the political system of the Federal Republic of Germany 
is dubbed a Chancellor system or Chancellor democracy (Kanzlerdemokratie). Ad-
ditionally, the Chancellor is a member of the European Council, directly participating 
in determining guidelines for the development and policy of the EU, which gives 
her a decisive vote on behalf of Germany (Görtemaker, 2008, p. 229; Bożyk, 2012, 
p. 135; Cziomer, 2013, p. 52).
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Democratic politicians had extremely different attitudes to the immigra-
tion crisis and the solutions put forward by Angela Merkel.
This paper aims to present and analyze the steps the Chancellor has 
taken in order to suppress increased immigration of Syrians to Germany. 
The solutions proposed by Angela Merkel are presented in the context of 
the responses they triggered among members of the CDU and CSU. Ano-
ther objective involves outlining the policy of the Chancellor, both Parties, 
and their representatives in the context of criticism of political costs related 
to admitting such large numbers of foreigners. Therefore, the issues of the 
ideological tenets and attitudes of the Christian Democrats on German po-
litical stage are discussed alongside the influence of Merkel’s Willkommen-
spolitik on the results of the 2017 elections to the Bundestag.
Importantly, not all the proposals of Chancellor Merkel regarding Sy-
rian immigrants have been discussed with the same frequency; the ma-
jority of responses, comments and criticism have been triggered by con-
troversial elements, including those that are related to the security of the 
German state and society, thus arousing the greatest concerns among the 
public. Other topics, mainly those related to logistics, have been discus-
sed only occasionally. That is why this paper addresses the six solutions 
proposed by the Chancellor which have been most frequently and exten-
sively discussed by the Christian Democrats over the period concerned.
1. Limiting the number of refugees admitted
Considerable emotions and criticism among the ranks of the Christian 
Democrats were stirred by Merkel’s refusal to limit the number of refuge-
es admitted to Germany. This topic was addressed particularly often after 
the events of New Year’s Eve, 2016, when women in Cologne, Düssel-
dorf, Hamburg and other German cities were attacked; after the Decem-
ber attack at the Christmas market in Berlin; and after the parliamentary 
elections in September 2017.
Taking urgent steps to limit the number of refugees and immigrants 
who continued to enter Germany was most encouraged by CSU politi-
cians, who believed that it would be “the right solution […] to establish 
a cap on the number of admitted refugees” (Pawlak, Niemcy: SPD…, 
2016). The CSU Chairman, Horst Seehofer was exceptionally active in 
this discussion, repeatedly suggesting that the annual limit for Germany 
be set at 200,000 refugees and declaring that he would not abandon this 
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demand (Dobrowolska-Polak, 2016; CSU-CHEF…, 2015; Schuler, CDU 
und CSU…, 2016; Schuler, Flüchtlingspolitik…, 2016; Edmund Stoiber…, 
2016).4 Markus Söder also repeatedly took a similar standpoint. This Ba-
varian Minister of Finance additionally demanded that such a limit be 
introduced to Germany’s Basic Law (Markus Söder…, 2015; Flüchtlinge: 
Söder…, 2015).5 He was supported by Rupert Scholz from the CDU, who 
argued that “the fundamental law stipulated in Art. 16(a) of the Basic 
Law6 is not a kind of a superior or overarching law that would not permit 
such limitations as a cap.” According to the former Minister of Defense, 
by setting such a limit “the federal government would recognize its obli-
gation to protect German identity” (Scholz, Flüchtlinge…, 2016).
During the December 2015 Congress of the CDU held in Karlsruhe, 
Merkel reached out to her critics saying that the number of refugees would 
have to be visibly limited and that this would be in the interest of refugees 
themselves, of Germany (due to the costs related to their subsistence, the 
integration of refugees into society and labor market) and in the interest 
of Europe (due to the internal character of the European Union and the 
global role of the EU) (Bericht der Vorsitzenden…, 2015, pp. 30, 31).7 
However, the Chancellor also opted to make asylum procedures stricter 
and to expand the list of safe countries of origin, in order to reduce the 
number of people eligible to apply for asylum in Germany. Soon after 
that, the CDU adopted the ten-point Mainz Declaration, that stressed that 
a considerable reduction in the number of refugees would make it pos-
sible to overcome this global challenge (Mainzer Erklärung..., 2016).
4 This number was calculated on the basis of the number of asylum applications 
submitted in 2014.
5 Horst Seehofer opposed this solution (Gräßler, 2016; Ein verschärftes Asyl-
recht…, 2015; Seehofer schießt gegen…, 2015; Antrag-Nr. C 53, Masseneinwan-
derung in die EU…, 2016, p. 215).
6 Art. 16(a) of Basic Law stipulates that “(1) Persons persecuted on political 
grounds shall have the right of asylum. (2) Paragraph (1) of this Article may not be 
invoked by a person who enters the federal territory from a member state of the Euro-
pean Communities or from another third state in which application of the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms is assured (Ustawa Zasadnicza..., 1997, p. 87). 
7 In her February exposé, Merkel said that the limitation is a shared aim “to 
continue to help people who truly need our protection” (Regierungserklärung von 
Bundeskanzlerin Dr. Angela Merkel zum Europäischen Rat am 18./19…, 2016; Matz-
ke, 2016). The Chancellor argued that the number of refugees could be reduced by 
combating the causes for refugeeism (Lasten teilen, Ursachen bekämpfen, 2015).
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This wording was unsatisfactory for the conservative CDU mem-
bers forming the Berlin Circle,8 who demanded “an unambiguous signal 
that Germany’s capacity to admit refugees is limited” (Angela Merkel: 
CDU…, 2016). Members of the CSU also remained unconvinced about 
Merkel’s concept of reducing the number of refugees admitted to Germa-
ny, and they stressed that while the number of asylum seekers had fallen 
in 2016 compared to the previous year, it would still exceed the limit 
of 130,000 they had proposed (Schuler, CDU…, 2016). Horst Seehofer 
argued that setting a cap on the number of refugees admitted was the “de-
sire of society” and that demanding the cap was not directed against the 
sister Party. He added that “the CSU is an independent Party which needs 
an independent policy” (Horst Seehofer…, 2016). Thomas Kreuzer, the 
leader of the CSU in the Bavarian Landtag, noted that his Party lacked an 
internal agreement on whether the number of 200,000 should cover only 
asylum seekers or also members of their families who might want to enter 
Germany as part of family reunification (Schuler, CDU…, 2016).
The 81st Congress of the CSU held on November 4–5, 2016 also fa-
iled to resolve this issue. In one of the resolutions, with a view to the 
receiving capacity of Germany, Bavarian Christian Democrats stressed 
the fact that Germany was able to accept a maximum number of 200,000 
new refugees annually. The Party also proposed that this limit be legally 
established. The CSU argued that Germany would be able to fulfill its 
“responsibility for local populations as well as for those refugees who are 
in dire need of protection provided that their inflow will be permanently 
limited.” According to a resolution adopted by the CSU, this was one 
of the three pillars of its refugee policy.9 Similar wording was included 
also in the Party’s basic policy. In this document, the CSU expressed its 
conviction that “immigration has to be monitored, controlled and limi-
ted.” Emphasis was also given to the requirement to prevent abuse and 
to granting the right to asylum only to persecuted persons. The Party was 
also firmly of the opinion that asylum and refugee protection should be 
8 The Berlin Circle (Ger.: Berliner Kreis) originated in 2011. It was founded and 
chaired by Christian Wagner, the leader of the CDU in the Hesse Landtag. The Berlin 
Circle includes, among others, Jörg Schönbohm – former Minister of Justice in the 
government of Brandenburg, Wolfgang Bosbach – the head of the Committee for In-
ternal Policy in the Bundestag, and Erika Steinbach – the leader of the Federation of 
Expellees (until she left the CSU) (Berliner Kreis in der Union, 2017).
9 The remaining two include restriction and integration (Leitantrag „Linksrutsch 
verhindern…, 2016, pp. 56–57).
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granted for a determined period, and if the reasons for such protection 
cease to exist or an abuse of the right to hospitality occurs, the asylum 
seeker would have to return to his country of origin (Die Ordnung…, 
2016, pp. 14–15).
Julia Klöckner also joined this discussion and presented her own ideas 
of how to reduce the number of immigrants in the eight-point Plan A2. 
The Vice-Chairperson of the CSU argued that Germany could not make 
the reduction of the number of refugees dependent on the goodwill of 
other governments in Europe and recommended that other policies should 
be sought. She said that “calling for the number of refugees to be reduced 
does not help anyone” and therefore people, local leaders and neighbors 
have to be shown that “such a reduction is truly happening.” Klöckner 
believed that it was equally important to send an unambiguous signal to 
the countries of refugees’ origin, but she was against establishing a cap on 
the number of refugees (Klöckner, 2016). Klöckner’s plan was approved 
of by some and criticized by other Christian Democrats, who treated it 
as competitive to Angela Merkel’s concepts. Yet Klöckner argued that 
her plan was complementary to Chancellor’s proposals, as it concerned 
the measures Germany could take to reduce the number of immigrants 
(Flüchtlingsdebatte…, 2016; SPD-Kritik…, 2016).
Horst Seehofer tried to take advantage of the negative social senti-
ments towards immigrants triggered by the attack at the Christmas market 
in December 2016 and to force Chancellor Merkel to allow the introduc-
tion of a limit on the number of refugees in the joint CDU/CSU govern-
ment policy (Kinkartz, 2016). He failed, and the document eventually sta-
ted that the Christian Democrats favored “the number of refugees coming 
to our country to remain low. Thanks to this, we will be able to meet our 
humanitarian obligations” (Für ein Deutschland, 2017, p. 55). Chancellor 
Merkel had also been pressed by the Freedom-Conservative Breakthro-
ugh Association (Ger.: Freiheitlich-Konservativen Aufbruch – FKA10) in-
cluding conservative members of the CDU and CSU, but they failed, too 
(CDU/CSU: Konservative…, 2017; Pawlak, Niemcy…, 2017).
The CSU tried to make the cap on the number of refugees admitted 
one of the main themes of its campaign before the September elections to 
the Bundestag. Therefore, it was uncertain whether the CSU would sup-
10 The Association was established on March 25, 2017 in Schwetzingen, Baden-
Wirtemberg. It was initiated by Alexander Mitsch who is its leader. The Association 
includes conservative members of the CDU and CSU (WerteUnion – Freiheitlich-
Konservativen Aufbruch, 2017).
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port Merkel if she decided to run for Chancellor again (Schuler, Flüch-
tlingspolitik…, 2016). The first indication was given during the Party’s 
Congress in December 2016. In spite of a number of CSU members cri-
ticizing Merkel’s refugee policy, and her refusal to limit the number of 
refugees admitted to Germany, the Party did not support Thomas Schmitt, 
who called for the Bavarian CSU to boycott Angela Merkel’s re-election 
as Chancellor.11 The doubts were completely dispelled in February 2017. 
During a joint press conference by Angela Merkel and Horst Seehofer in 
Munich, the Chairman of the CSU praised Merkel as an “excellent Chan-
cellor” and stated that his proposal to join forces in the election campaign 
with the CDU was received with “great approval” by his Party members. 
Both politicians admitted that the issue of the cap on the number of refu-
gees admitted had not been resolved. While Merkel diplomatically sug-
gested that her focus was to win the elections, the Chairman of the CSU 
emphasized that a coalition agreement lacking this provision would not 
be signed by CSU representatives (Otto, 2017). Indeed, after the Bunde-
stag elections, the CSU returned to this issue. In October, Markus Blume, 
Vice-Secretary General of the CSU, published a ten-point policy which 
he had consulted with Horst Seehofer, including the postulate of “a clear 
limitation of immigration” (Blume, 2017; Zehn-Punkte-Plan…, 2017).
At a press conference held on the following day, Merkel and Seehofer 
presented the Migration Masterplan. The document stated that it presented 
the joint standpoint of both Parties which “follows from the government 
policy as well as from the joint decisions made by the CDU and CSU.12 
11 Justifying his motion, the Vice-Chairman of the Bavarian CSU accused the 
Chancellor of “having defied awkward but ethically indispensable principles” thereby 
enabling the unprecedented, unmonitored entry to Germany of immigrants “from the 
most backwards, violent, anti-Christian and misogynistic regions in the world.” He 
also argued that the Chancellor was being irresponsible and politically short-sighted, 
since she had repeatedly said in public that the right to asylum had no cap and con-
cealed the fact that “immigrants arriving from safe third countries cannot apply for 
asylum in Germany under German asylum law.” According to Schmitt, “Dr. Merkel’s 
statement uttered on public television […] had been irresponsible and marked a col-
lapse of the authority of a sovereign state. In this way, Dr. Merkel has not risen to the 
vow she made to the German nation” (Antrag-Nr. L 6. Keine CSU-Unterstützung…, 
2016, pp. 502–503).
12 The joint government policy stressed the fact that, due to recognizing Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Algeria, Morocco 
and Tunisia as safe countries of origin, the number of persons applying for asylum 
had been considerably cut. Another reason for boasting was the fact that the personal 
details of all asylum applicants had been collected in a new data storage system and 
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[…] We continue our efforts to permanently reduce the number of people 
fleeing to Germany and Europe, so that a situation similar to that in 2015 
does not recur and cannot be repeated […]. We want to ensure that the 
total number of persons admitted for humanitarian reasons (refugees and 
asylum seekers, people who are additionally protected, as part of family 
reunification, relocation and resettlement, excluding returns and volunta-
ry departures of future refugees) will not exceed 200,000 a year. […] If, 
contrary to expectations, the abovementioned objective is not achieved 
due to an international or domestic situation, the federal government and 
the Bundestag will decide on the appropriate adjustment [of this number 
– A.B.] up or down” (Regelwerk…, 2017).
This solution can be deemed a compromise – the CSU succeeded in 
having the annual limit of admitted refugees established at 200,000 and 
gaining control over future decisions to be made by Merkel as regarded 
the admission of refugees (due to the inclusion of Bundestag deputies in 
the decision process), while Merkel obtained the possibility of changing 
the limit (Delhaes, 2017; Zuwanderung: Grüne…, 2017).
2. European quotas and fair burden sharing
Although initially skeptical about the concept of the Minister of Inter-
nal Affairs, Thomas de Maizière, to set annual European quotas,13 Angela 
Merkel gradually became more and more convinced. This change was 
caused by an increasing crisis among the Christian Democrats and a drop 
in voter support. Additionally, the proposal of introducing annual limits at 
the European level gave a chance to bring to an end the conflict dividing 
the Christian Democrats with respect to the methods of limiting the influx 
of refugees and immigrants to Germany (Ciechanowicz, 2015; Gwóźdź, 
2016). The Chancellor herself stressed the fact that “the quotas agreed 
by European states are a way to legitimize illegality, and also to better 
order and manage the processes; combined with combating the causes of 
immigration this would also limit the number of refugees arriving here. 
[…] I believe that this is the path we have to take to resolve our problems 
effective measures had been taken against those persons who were not eligible for 
protection (“Für ein Deutschland, in dem wir gut und gerne leben”…, 2017, p. 55).
13 The concept of annual European quotas first emerged in the government coali-
tion on September 19, 2015. They were suggested by Thomas de Maizière from the 
CDU (Ciechanowicz, 2015).
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because we will not solve them by merely isolating ourselves. We need 
the whole of the European Union for this purpose.”14
Chancellor Merkel combined the issue of European quotas with that 
of the negotiations with Turkey and the relocation of refugees who had 
entered EU member states. In both cases, this involved the transfer of part 
of refugees and their fair distribution among all of member states. Each 
of the 28 EU member states was expected to admit refugees according to 
a formula designed by the European Commission with reference to the 
economic capacity, population, unemployment rate and the number of 
refugees a given country had already sheltered (Schuler, Flüchtlinge…, 
2015; Matzke, 2015). This was the context in which, during the meeting 
of the CDU Federal Board in January 2016, the Party agreed in the Mainz 
Declaration to achieve a fair European division of asylum seekers in need 
of protection (Mainzer Erklärung..., 2016).15
European quotas were supported by Minister of Finance, Wolfgang 
Schäuble, and by Vice-Chairperson of the CDU, Julia Klöckner (Schul-
er, Wolfgang…, 2016; Klöckner, 2016). This solution was also praised 
by Thomas Strobl, who hoped that it would be backed by the remaining 
EU states (Flüchtlingsaufnahme…, 2016). When this turned out not to 
be the case, the Chancellor suggested the establishment of a ‘coalition 
of willing’ (Koalition der Willigen), which failed to be welcome by all 
the Christian Democrats. It was particularly criticized by the Minister of 
Transportation, Alexander Dobrindt from the CSU (Fietz, CSU…, 2015). 
The Berlin Circle opted for the quotas, while stressing that they had to 
correspond to the capacity of Germany and other states to accept immi-
grants.16 CSU members forming the Conservative Breakthrough (Ger.: 
Konservativer Aufbruch17) were far more critical, arguing that the quotas 
would not have any impact on eradicating the causes of the refugee crisis 
or the adverse outcomes of the influx of illegal immigrants experienced 
14 She also stressed the fact that thanks to the quotas, the refugees in Turkey 
would be ensured better living standards. Another element mentioned was financial 
aid for Turkey (Lasten teilen, Ursachen bekämpfen, 2015).
15 A similar wording featured in a resolution passed during the 28th Party Con-
gress (Beschluss. Karlsruher Erklärung zu Terror und Sicherheit…, 2015).
16 In the opinion of the Berlin Circle, “the relocation of illegal immigrants in 
Europe can take place only in highly justified and absolutely exceptional cases” (Asyl 
und Einwanderung…, 2016).
17 The Konservativer Aufbruch! CSU-Basisbewegung für Werte und Freiheit was 
founded in 2014 by CSU members – Lars Bergen, Thomas Jahn and Konstanze Thiele 
(Wer sind wir?, 2014).
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by different member states. They treated this solution as a “short-term 
response to a humanitarian catastrophe” (Positionspapier..., 2015).
In the basic policy adopted in November 2016 the CSU stated that “aid 
to refugees and those in need of protection may be provided through inter-
nationally established quotas,” and the Party continued its attempts to set the 
cap of refugees admitted to Germany while the Chancellor tried to avoid it. 
The CSU stressed that it supported Germany’s humanitarian responsibilities 
adding, however, that “we cannot admit everybody who wants to join us. Oth-
erwise our aid efforts will fail” (Die Ordnung…, 2016, pp. 14–15, 41). Giving 
the unrelenting position of Chancellor Merkel as regarded setting a cap on 
refugees admitted, the CDU and CSU briefly declared in their joined policy 
that “Europe bears shared a responsibility for refugees, [people – A.B.] who 
are persecuted or in need,” which meant that “all European states have to 
fulfill their obligations” (Für ein Deutschland…, 2017, pp. 56–57, 70). By 
this token, the policy did not address the sensitive issue of the number of 
admitted refugees focusing on supporting European quotas instead.18
The issue of refugee relocation was returned to after the parliamentary 
elections; this time, however, not by the representatives of both Parties,19 
but by the youth of the CDU/CSU (Ger.: Junge Union Deutschlands – JU). 
They published a Dresden Declaration in which they stated that “while the 
number of refugees has dropped significantly since summer 2015 and in 
spite of many legislative and procedural improvements, certain people’s 
trust in the EU’s immigration policy has been seriously undermined.” In 
spite of enormous problems that the relocation of refugees encountered 
in EU states, the young Party members opted for “a quotas-based solu-
tion for quick humanitarian admission of refugees and their families from 
crisis-ridden regions” (Dresdner Erklärung… 2017, p. 3; Balzer, 2017).
3. Deportation of persons who fail to meet the criteria for asylum  
or refugee protection
In response to the events of New Year’s Eve 2016, when women were 
attacked in Cologne, Düsseldorf, Hamburg and other German cities, the 
CSU Federal Board adopted the Mainz Declaration, in which it stressed 
18 The quotas were supported by the Berlin Circle and the Freedom-Conservative 
Breakthrough (Pressemitteilung, 2017).
19 The Migration Masterplan agreed by both the Christian-Democratic Parties did 
not make any reference to the European quotas.
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the need for the rapid deportation of persons who had been denied asylum. 
It was also noted that persons who had been granted asylum, refugees and 
asylum seekers should be denied protection in the future if they had been 
sentenced to prison (including probation). By this token, the CSU wanted 
to remove obstacles impeding the expulsion and deportation of criminals 
from abroad (Mainzer Erklärung…, 2016).20 Christian Democrats, such 
as Peter Tauber, were in general agreement with the Chancellor that, due 
to the situation in Syria, Syrian refugees should not be deported to their 
country of origin (Alexander, Vitzthum, 2016).
The CDU made a statement on the issue of immigrant deportation 
shortly before, and during the 29th Party Congress held in Essen. CSU Vi-
ce-Chairman, who also held the office of the Minister of Internal Affairs 
in Baden-Wirtemberg, Thomas Strobl, called for the extension of custody 
to secure deportation and for the deportation of asylum seekers who were 
ill.21 His demands were considered at the meeting of the Party Board be-
fore the congress (Schuler, CDU…, 2016). In a declaration adopted then 
it was said that “the number of people who voluntarily left or were depor-
ted after they had been rejected asylum could be significantly increased” 
(Orientierung…, 2016, pp. 15–17). In this situation, Chancellor Merkel 
declared that all the immigrants who did not have the right to stay would 
have to leave Germany (Bericht der Vorsitzenden…, 2016, p. 20).
The demands for deportation and a stricter asylum law for refugees 
intensified especially after the attack at the Christmas market in Berlin. 
In response, Chancellor Merkel announced drafting a law that would al-
low better enforcement of the obligation to leave the country by refugees 
who were denied or had the right to stay withdrawn (Pressekonferenz von 
Bundeskanzlerin Merkel, 2017).22 Thomas de Maizière and Heiko Maas 
(SPD), the Minister of Justice, jointly designed a plan in which they de-
manded deportation of foreigners also after the expiry of the then-current 
three-month period, and the extension of detention before expulsion from 
four to ten days. In the opinion of these two politicians, foreigners who 
had to leave the country and who had been identified as threatening public 
20 The issue of quick deportation of persons whose asylum applications have been 
rejected or who have committed crimes also emerged during the 28th Congress of the 
Party (Beschluss. Karlsruher Erklärung zu Terror…, 2015, p. 14).
21 Peter Tauber spoke in a similar vein, saying that illness should not prevent 
deportation in every case (Alexander, Vitzthum, 2016).
22 The law came into force in the second half of 2017 (Gesetz zur besseren Durch-
setzung der Ausreisepflicht…, 2017).
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security should be monitored using electronic bracelets. Asylum seekers 
who did not provide their true identity were to be subject to more strin-
gent residence requirements and to be punished for their violation (Si-
cherheitspaket…, 2017; Abdi-Herrle, Otto, 2017). These proposals were 
more moderate than the demands of conservative CSU members, who in 
2015 demanded, for example, to punish immigrants for providing false 
details (Positionspapier…, 2015).
In the joint government policy, the Christian Democrats postulated in-
tensification of the efforts to return and, if appropriate, deport those who-
se asylum applications had been legally rejected (Für ein Deutschland…, 
2017, p. 55). Similar postulates emerged among the members of the Berlin 
Circle and the Freedom-Conservative Breakthrough, who demanded the 
quick and consistent deportation of people who had not received asylum, 
criminals and persons posing a potential threat, and extending federal su-
pervision over deportations (Pressemitteilung, Berlin, 2017).
4. Borders and control over the flow of immigrants
The step most widely commented on, and criticized by the Christian 
Democrats was Chancellor Angela Merkel’s opening of the state borders 
in September 2015 and permitting refugees in Budapest to enter Germa-
ny. Later on, she repeatedly had to explain the decision. During the CDU 
Congress on December 14–15, 2015, the Chancellor stressed that “this 
situation has put our European values to the test more than ever before. 
I state: it was nothing more and nothing less than a humanitarian imperati-
ve” (Bericht der Vorsitzenden…, 2015, p. 26).23 One year later, at the next 
CSU Congress in Essen, she promised that the opening of the borders, 
like that in 2015, could not be repeated in the future (Bericht der Vorsit-
zenden…, 2016, p. 2; Ciechanowicz, Zjazd federalny…, 2016).24 She also 
23 Her objective was to restore control over who, and how many people enter 
Germany. Only those who did not want to submit their asylum application in Ger-
many could be sent back (Ciechanowicz, „Uchodźcy”…, 2015). Thus, the Chancellor 
spoke about cooperation between Lands and creating a uniform ID card for a refugee, 
which a refugee could present, for instance, in the Federal Office for Migration and 
Refugees, in the courts and in the Federal Employment Agency – thanks to which 
he would not have to register multiple times (Rede von Bundeskanzlerin Merkel zum 
Einzelplan 04, 2015).
24 She could be heard making a similar statement at the congress of the Junge 
Union (Pawlak, Merkel o polityce…, 2016).
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did not rule out the reinstatement of border controls on the borders with 
all neighboring countries (Ciechanowicz, Kontyngenty…, 2015).
Again, on this point, the most severe criticism came from Horst Se-
ehofer. According to the CSU Chairman, “this was a precedent that has 
led to an uncontrolled influx of immigrants to Germany.” In order to stop 
the influx, the politician supported the concept of the Prime Minister of 
Hungary, Viktor Orbán, to build a wall on the border with Serbia and Cro-
atia; he also assured Hungary that “Bavaria was ready to help to protect 
the external border of the European Union” (Ciechanowicz, “Uchodź-
cy”…, 2015; Premier Bawarii…, 2017). Prime Minister of Bavaria went 
as far as setting an ultimatum to the Chancellor – if the influx of immi-
grants was not stopped, Bavarian authorities would file the case with the 
Federal Constitutional Tribunal (Angela Merkel nieugięta…, 2016). He 
also criticized Angela Merkel for failing to exert pressure on Austria to 
halt immigrants travelling across its territory thus helping them reach the 
German border. Foreign Minister Thomas de Maiziére joined him in the 
criticism of the Austrian government (Ciechanowicz, Niemcy…, 2015).
The opening of borders for refugees was also heavily criticized by 
Erika Steinbach. According to the leader of the Union of Expellees, “eve-
rything that had changed in the CDU earlier, was overshadowed in 2015 
[...] by the independent decision of the Chancellor, who not only admitted 
to Germany more than one million unverified immigrants who were not 
stopped for many months, but also transported them by buses and trains; 
although many came from a safe country of origin, and therefore, in ac-
cordance with EU law (the Dublin Agreement) they should have been tur-
ned back.” Steinbach argued that Merkel had considerably harmed both 
the CDU and Germany by taking independent decisions in key policy 
areas. In an act of rejecting such a policy, Steinbach decided to leave the 
party after more than forty years of membership of the CDU, dramatically 
emphasizing, “this is not my Party anymore!” (Lüdemann, 2017).
A group of CDU/CSU deputies to the Bundestag who were all mem-
bers of the Middle Class (Ger.: Parlamentskreis Mittelstand)25 parliamen-
tary circle also tried to force the Chancellor to depart from the policy of 
open borders. To this end, the deputies called for a formal motion to close 
the borders of Germany against refugees to be drafted. Christian von Stet-
ten, who chaired this circle, stressed that “the review of the matter of the 
25 The circle was established in 2011 and included 190 deputies (as of 2015) (Par-
lamentskreis Mittelstand, 2017).
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proper protection of the borders and border strengthening should not be 
any taboo.” The idea of submitting a motion on this matter was supported 
by a CSU politician, Stephan Mayer, who expressed the hope that “the 
Chancellor will acknowledge the fact that the open borders policy cannot 
be continued” (Pawlak, Merkel…, 2015). Von Stetten, the main initiator 
of the motion, was criticized by Michael Hennrich and Armin Schuster, 
who believed that forcing the Party faction to vote was “counterproduc-
tive and dangerous” and “could only lead to a breakup” (Wallet, 2015). 
Julia Klöckner, CDU Vice-Chairperson, argued in her Plan A2 that, being 
an exporter, Germany “cannot afford to close the borders in the double 
sense of the word. It is also not useful for practical reasons” (Klöckner, 
2016).
The CDU and CSU stressed in their government policy that the Eu-
ropean Union had to guarantee internal and external security to member 
states because “in an increasingly globalized world, no country in Europe 
can guard its own interests without the support of others.” The Christian 
Democrats believed that the EU “must effectively protect its external bor-
ders against illegal immigration, strengthen the Frontex border protection 
agency and conclude the construction of the European asylum system.” 
The Parties also stressed that “as long as the EU’s external borders are not 
protected, internal border controls will be maintained” (Für ein Deutsch-
land, 2017, pp. 56–57, 70).
5. Compulsory integration
The discussion of CDU members on integration referred to the contro-
versial concept of German as a ‘leading culture’ (Leitkultur), introduced 
into the public debate during the election campaign in 2002. The Christian 
Democrats associated it with the thesis that foreigners have to assimilate 
(including the ban on double citizenship) and with the ‘parallel societies’ 
slogan (Parallelgesellschaften), which illustrated the presence of social 
disintegration in Germany. Since one of the priorities in this period was 
to control the access of foreigners to the German labor market, attempts 
were made to persuade economic migrants to return to their respective 
countries of origin and to limit the number of immigrants admitted (inc-
luding asylum seekers and displaced people of German origin).26
26 A comprehensive system of integration policies was introduced three years later 
by the Immigration Law (Zuwanderungsgesetz). Its coordination was entrusted to the 
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The integration of immigrants and refugees into German society was 
the subject of lively discussion during the CDU Congress in December 
2015. In this context, it was stressed that people who wanted to stay in 
Germany ought to learn German (Thomas de Maizière), take up an ap-
prenticeship/work (Thomas de Maizière), observe German values and 
traditions, that is, follow the German ‘leading culture’ (Angela Merkel, 
Karin Maag, Thomas de Maizière, Peter Tauber), recognize the priority 
of German law over Sharia (Thomas Strobl), and respect the equality of 
women and men (Julia Klöckner, Annette Widmann-Mauz) (Protokoll. 
28. Parteitag…, 2015, pp. 40, 49–50, 52, 57, 62, 92–93, 95, 134).
The resolution adopted during the congress stressed that integration 
means “to support and to demand.” According to the CDU, “integration 
depends on the readiness of those who come to us to respect our way 
of life and our culture and to learn our language. […] We are guided by 
the Christian image of humans and by the system of law and values of 
our country. This foundation of values applies to everyone – those who 
have rights and obligations. Refugees need a hand to be stretched out to 
them. However, refugees also need a hand that will show them how our 
common life works.” Therefore, each integration course was supposed 
to not only teach the language, but also “convey the basic principles of 
conduct and the main content of our ‘leading culture.’” In order to avoid 
“mistakes from the past,” it was postulated to prevent the emergence of 
“parallel societies” and to eliminate existing parallel structures. The mul-
ti-kulti (multiculturality) model was also rejected as an inappropriate “so-
lution to integration issues” (Beschluss. Karlsruher Erklärung…, 2015, 
pp. 17–19). The Mainz Declaration adopted in January 2016 at the me-
eting of the CDU Federal Board featured similar words. In addition, the 
efforts to adopt a law at the federal and Land levels defining the mutual 
rights and obligations of the state and immigrants, were supported (Inte-
grationspflichtgesetz). It was stressed that the integration process should 
involve both sides, and that for immigrants who do not want to integra-
te for a long period of time, penalties should be imposed, such as the 
severance of benefits. The Declaration also included the statement that 
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 
– BAMF) (Szaniawska-Schwabe, 2009, pp. 10–14, 22–23; Integrationsgesetz vom 
31. Juli 2016, 2016, pp. 1939–1949). As part of integration, on April 22, 2016, the 
Chancellor and the heads of federal state governments agreed on A joint concept of the 
federation and Lands regarding the successful integration of refugees (Meseberger 
Erklärung zur Integration, 2016).
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“to support and to demand has been and remains a Christian-Democratic 
principle of successful integration” (Mainzer Erklärung…, 2016).
The CSU perceived the integration of immigrants into German society 
in very similar terms. Therefore, the Party attached great importance to 
the integration of people who “have a prospect of staying” in Germany.27 
In return, they were required to be “ready to integrate on the basis of our 
‘leading culture’” (Leitantrag…, 2016, pp. 56–57). The basic policy ad-
opted by the CSU in 2016 stressed that “integration is necessary and its 
direction has been determined. Whoever stays with us has to integrate. 
There can be no areas excluded from integration” because they would 
become a foundation for radicalization. According to the Party, integra-
tion has to mean that “those who come to us, adjust. Integration cannot 
mean that we adjust.” By this token, the Party stressed that it wanted 
immigrants “to live according to our principles,” namely following “our 
‘leading culture’ rather than multiculturality.” The concept of multi-kulti 
was rejected as leading to intolerance, ghettoes and violence. It was ad-
ditionally stressed that German rules apply in Germany and not the rules 
of the country of origin, also in such matters as equality of rights for men 
and women, tolerance for different lifestyles and freedom of opinion, be-
liefs and religion. Among other things, this meant no consent to full body 
covering with a burka or niqab in public spaces, which in the opinion of 
the CSU “does not fit our cultural space and our understanding of the role 
of women” (Die Ordnung, 2016, pp. 14–15).
The CSU also propagated the opinion that successful integration is 
based on the ‘we support and demand’ principle. They stressed that “so-
ciety, state and industry make considerable investments in teaching the 
language, training and ensuring access to the labor market. This cannot 
replace the readiness to integrate. Integration is a debt. Those who in-
tegrate, have better prospects for staying. We are in favor of an explicit 
expression of, and demand for the immigrants’ duty to integrate. If they 
cannot prove progress in integration, they have to leave. […] Integra-
tion also means loyalty to the German people. Anyone who comes to 
us is expected to be associated with our state and its institutions. Acting 
against Germany is therefore reprehensible. We will not allow the ethnic, 
religious or political conflicts of foreign nationalities in our land” (Die 
Ordnung, 2016, pp. 14–15).
27 CDU members, such as Merkel or Maizière, also spoke about this (Integration-
sgesetz setzt auf Fördern…, 2016).
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The German Minister of Internal Affairs tried to explain what the 
‘leading culture’ that was being referred to by both Parties actually was. 
According to Thomas de Maizière, the term Leitkultur is made of two 
parts; the word ‘culture’ indicates that “this is not about legal regulations 
but about the unwritten rules of our coexistence;” while the word ‘lead-
ership’ refers to “something different than ordering or requiring. This is 
more about what guides us, what is important to us, what we care about. 
[…] Leitkultur can and should be an example, first and foremost. Those 
who are sure of their ‘leading culture’ are strong. The strength and in-
ternal security of one’s own culture results in tolerance towards others. 
Thus, the ‘leading culture’ is primarily something that distinguishes us. 
If it leads us, in the best sense of the word, it will exert its influence on 
others. Also on those who come to us and can stay. We are reaching out to 
them” (Thomas de Maizière…, 2017).
Discussing the Leitkultur and its aspects in the context of immigrant 
integration, Maizière stressed that people who have arrived in Germany 
and have prospects of staying but “don’t know, maybe don’t want to know, 
or even reject the ‘leading culture’” stand a slim chance of integration 
“because they will not have a sense of belonging.” The Minister pointedly 
indicated the differences between the above-mentioned culture, and the 
one he meaningfully described as “the culture of the burka.” In his opin-
ion, showing one’s face is an expression of democratic coexistence and of 
an open society. He emphasized that “in everyday life it is important to us 
whether we are looking at the friendly or sad faces of our interlocutors.” 
He also drew attention to the fact that respect and tolerance are valued in 
Germany. According to Maizière, Germany accepts “different forms of 
living,” which means that those “who reject them put themselves outside 
of society.” He added that “violence is not socially approved” and that 
German society “does not associate dignity with violence.” He also ar-
gued that in Germany, churches “unite people not only in faith, but also 
in everyday life, in nurseries and schools, in nursing homes and in active 
social work. The binder of our society is created in the Christian church, 
in the synagogue and in the mosque.” This is possible because Germany 
“has a specific state-church relationship. Our state is neutral ideologically 
but friendly towards churches and religious communities. The rhythm of 
our year is dictated by church holidays. Our landscape is characterized 
by church towers. Ours is a Christian country. We live in peace. Its basis 
is the unconditional primacy of law over all religious rules of state and 
social coexistence” (Thomas de Maizière…, 2017). This understanding of 
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the ‘leading culture’ won support from members of the Berlin Circle, the 
FKA and Konrad’s Heirs (Ger.: Konrads Erben28) (Pressemitteilung. Der 
Berliner Kreis und…, 2017; Rhöndorfer Manifest, 2016).
The issue of the integration of immigrants (including refugees) into 
the German state was only briefly addressed in the joint government poli-
cy for 2017–2021. The CDU and CSU stated there that “it is in the mutual 
interest for the integration to run smoothly” and promised that they would 
prevent the emergence of parallel societies and multiculturality (Für ein 
Deutschland, 2017, pp. 56–57, 70).
6. Limiting the right to family reunification
The issue of the possibility of immigrants bringing their families in 
also stirred a lot of discussion. During the 80th CSU Congress, the Party 
adopted a motion put forward by its Board which demanded the suspen-
sion of the immigrant right to family reunification as far as possible. In the 
case of persons subject to subsidiary protection, the right should be com-
pletely suspended. According to this motion, “Germany should not give 
a signal that everyone can come to us, that everyone can stay permanently 
and that everyone can bring in family members” (Leitantrag „Deutsch-
land braucht…, 2015, p. 27). Later, the CSU mitigated its position by 
agreeing to let immigrants who are in work and able to support their re-
latives to bring in members of their immediate family, and by proposing 
the temporary suspension of the right to family reunification for persons 
with subsidiary protection (Klarer Kurs bei der Zuwanderung..., 2016, 
p. 5; Leitantrag „Linksrutsch verhindern…, 2016, p. 52). CDU members 
spoke in a similar vein at the Kahrlsruhe Congress, postulating a two-year 
suspension period for the right to bring in family members by persons 
who had been granted temporary protection (Beschluss. Karlsruher Er-
klärung…, 2015, p. 17). Angela Merkel explained that due to the large 
number of immigrants coming to Germany, making a quick decision on 
this matter was not possible. This was supported by Wolfgang Schäuble, 
who argued that family reunification must be restricted so as not to lose 
control over the number of immigrants arriving in Germany (60. Proto-
koll, 2015, pp. 33, 87–88). This issue was also very briefly addressed by 
28 A group of former holders of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation’s scholarships, 
bringing together conservative, socio-Christian and liberal members of both the 
Christian-Democratic Parties (Wer wir sind, 2017). 
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the CDU at the 29th Congress in Essen (Sonstige Beschlüsse 29. Parte-
itag…, Beschluss C 92, C 143, C 146, Migration und Integration, 2016, 
p. 39). These demands by the Christian Democrats were accommoda-
ted in the Asylum Package II (Asylpaket II) agreed at the end of January 
2016, which, for the period proposed by the CDU, suspended the right to 
family reunification for immigrants who have not fulfilled the criteria for 
granting refugee status within the meaning of the Geneva Convention of 
1951 (Gesetz zur Einführung…, Arikel 2. Änderung des Aufenthaltsgeset-
zes, 2016, p. 3; Aufenthaltsgesetz…, § 104 Übergangsregelungen, 2017, 
p. 112).
The debate on this subject intensified after the parliamentary elec-
tions in September, due to the approaching termination of the suspension 
of the right to family reunification for people with subsidiary protection, 
and the coalition negotiations under way. Just before the beginning of 
the talks between representatives of the CDU, CSU, Alliance 90/The 
Greens (Ger.: Bündnis 90/Die Grünen) and the Free Democratic Party 
(Ger.: Freie Demokratische Partei – FDP), or the Jamaican Coalition, 
members of the Freedom-Conservative Breakthrough, called for run-
ning such an asylum and immigration policy that would account for the 
interests of Germany and for the protection of European and Western 
values of German society. In the published document, they opted for the 
right to bring in members of the immediate family (i.e. the spouse and 
minor children) to be awarded to politically persecuted persons who 
were granted temporary asylum in Germany on the basis of the Geneva 
Convention. The right to bring in spouses and minor children was also 
given to foreigners who came to Germany in accordance with immigra-
tion law, if they could provide them with maintenance. They demanded, 
however, to refuse the right to family reunification to all other immi-
grants, also including those who had been granted subsidiary protection 
(WerteUnion – Freiheitlich-Konservativen Aufbruch Einwanderung…, 
2017, p. 6). In the Immigration Masterplan which was agreed two days 
later, the CDU and CSU opted for the extension of the suspension of the 
right to bring in families for people under subsidiary protection (Regel-
werk zur Migration, 2017).
During the coalition talks with the Alliance 90/The Greens and the 
FDP, the CSU firmly held to its position. Horst Seehofer explained that 
the CSU “does not want family reunification for people who can stay 
with us only temporarily.” On the other hand, the CDU tried to meet the 
expectations of potential coalition partners – Angela Merkel suggested 
166 Agnieszka Bielawska ŚSP 3 ’19
that a monthly cap of 500 persons be established on the number of pe-
ople arriving in Germany under family reunification (Angela Merkel: 
Kanzlerin…, 2017). Differences in the approach to family reunification, 
however, turned out to be too large, becoming one of the reasons why the 
Jamaican Coalition could not be established.
Even before the possible coalition talks with the SPD commenced, 
Horst Seehofer objected to the plans of the Social Democrats to allow 
refugees with limited protection status to bring in their families starting 
in March 2018. The CSU Chairman explained that the lifting of the re-
strictions would trigger mass immigration, which would “completely 
overwhelm Germany’s ability to integrate” (Regierungsbildung: Se-
ehofer…, 2017). The CDU Vice-Chairman called on the parties to seek 
a compromise. According to Armin Laschet, family reunification should 
be permitted in specific circumstances, and in the case of refugees who 
had accommodation and employment in Germany (Regierungsbildung: 
Unionspolitiker…, 2017).
At the beginning of 2018, the CDU/CSU parliamentary faction pro-
posed a bill to extend the suspension on bringing the closest family mem-
bers for persons with subsidiary protection until the new regulations were 
passed, which was assumed to have happened by July 31 (Gesetzentwurf 
der Fraktion der CDU/CSU..., 2018). The CSU hoped that by that time 
it would be able to push through or re-suspend the right to family reuni-
fication for immigrants with subsidiary protection, or to link the number 
of relatives brought in as part of family reunification with the cap on 
admitted refugees postulated by the Party (200,000 per year) (Otto, CSU-
Klausurtagung…, 2018). Thomas de Maizière suggested finding a com-
promise on this point, stressing that “neither a long-term suspension nor 
a long-term permission is a solution.” At that time, he was in favor of 
“limited, controlled and gradual family reunions” (Bundestag: Hitzige…, 
2018).
On February 1, the Bundestag, in its second and third reading, pas-
sed a law extending the suspension of family reunification for persons 
granted subsidiary protection until July 31, 2018, and the regulations 
on family reunification for refugees covered by that protection. By vir-
tue of these regulations, starting on August 1, for humanitarian reasons, 
permission to enter Germany was granted to 1,000 persons per month 
– the spouses of persons who had received subsidiary protection, minor 
children of persons with such protection or the parents of minors with 
such protection. Special cases (pursuant to Art. 22 of the Residence Law) 
ŚSP 3 ’19 Christian Democrat policy in the face of the influx of Syrian... 167
were not included in this quota (Deutscher Bundestag, Stenografischer 
Bericht…, 2018; Aufenthaltsgesetz in der Fassung der Bekanntmachung 
vom…, 2017, p. 36).
Conclusions
Merkel’s policy towards Syrian refugees divided members of the 
CDU and CSU into devoted advocates on the one side and moderate and 
less moderate critics on the other. It also brought back questions about 
the ideological foundations and the future of her own Party, also in the 
context of the elections to local parliaments in 2016 and to the Bundestag 
in September 2017.
Thomas de Maizière and Wolfgang Schäuble were cautious when 
speaking about the refugee policy of Chancellor Merkel. Julia Klöck-
ner expressed her implicit disapproval, as did the Prime Minister of 
Saxony-Anhalt – Rainer Haseloff, and the Prime Minister of Hesse 
– Volker Bouffier. Politicians who were more harsh in their criticism 
of Merkel’s Willkommenspolitik included Alexander Mitsch, Thomas 
Strobl, Erika Steinbach and Mike Mohringa (CDU Chairman in Thu-
ringia), speaking about the Party abandoning its conservative values. 
It was the ‘marginalization’ of this right-wing pillar of the CDU, and 
the immigration policy pursued by the German Chancellor, that led 
to Steinbach leaving the Party in January 2017 and to the emergence 
of conservative alliances, such as the Freedom-Conservative Break-
through or Konrad’s Heirs. Both Steinbach and Mitsch admitted that 
Merkel had started directing the party towards the center long before 
the first immigrants and refugees from Syria started to reach Germa-
ny; nevertheless the migration crisis and Willkommenspolitik were the 
main factors triggering the greater activity of conservatives, who deci-
ded to regain a prominent position and influence on the Party’s policy, 
including immigration policy.
The criticism of the Chancellor from CDU members was connec-
ted with fears that Merkel’s policy towards immigrants would result in 
the Party losing power in the Landtags and the Bundestag, including 
through the loss of conservative, dissatisfied voters in favor of the Al-
ternative for Germany (AfD). The opposition to this policy came mainly 
from CDU members from former East Germany, who were most con-
cerned about the influx of immigrants and the growing threat from the 
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anti-immigrant AfD, which was gaining increasing popularity (Kubiak, 
2015). Still, the opponents of Merkel’s refugee policy were in the mi-
nority, and their criticism was not intended to remove her from office as 
Chairperson of the Party. This is evidenced by at least two facts. Firstly, 
there was no explicit rebellion against her leadership of the CDU du-
ring 2015, which was certainly the most difficult year for Merkel since 
becoming Chancellor. Secondly, during the 2016 Congress in Essen, 
members of the CDU elected her for the ninth time as its Chairperson by 
a sweeping majority (89.5%) (Ciechanowicz, Zjazd federalny…, 2016). 
It was probably considered that, for the general good of the Party and 
because of the upcoming parliamentary elections, it was more advan-
tageous to support Angela Merkel than to play out internal conflicts in 
public.29 It should also be emphasized in this context that there was no 
competitor in the Party strong enough to threaten Merkel’s leadership; 
for instance, Karl Theodor zu Guttenberg left politics after he had been 
found to have plagiarized his doctoral dissertation; Wolfgang Schäu-
ble was not eager to run due to his age; Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer 
lacked political experience; Peter Altmeier and Ursula von der Leyen 
advocated the continuation of Merkel’s policy and did not present dif-
ferent views; Thomas de Maizière and Armin Laschet were loyal to the 
Chancellor; and the support enjoyed by the CDU was strongly related 
to the social support for the Chancellor herself. This is evidenced by the 
fact that, despite the excesses of the refugees in Cologne and other cities 
on the 2016 New Year’s Eve, and the Berlin attack in December 2016, 
which temporarily reversed the sympathy of public opinion, Germany 
still shared the point of view of its Chancellor. According to a Deutsch-
landtrend poll, which was carried out in March 2017 for channel one of 
the German public television ARD, Merkel’s policy enjoyed the appro-
val of as many as 60% of respondents. This was the highest number of 
positive responses that she had received since September 2015 (ARD-
DeutschlandTREND: März…, 2017).30 The high support was also reve-
aled during the September elections to the Bundestag, when the CDU 
obtained 200 out of 709 seats (26.8% of votes).31
29 A similar situation took place during the Congress in December 2015 (Bach-
mann, CDU i kanclerz…, 2015, p. 2).
30 After the September Bundestag elections, support for Merkel increased to 63% 
(ARD-DeutschlandTREND…, 2017).
31 The CSU received 46 seats (6.2% of votes) (Bundestagswahl 2017: Endgül-
tiges Ergebnis, 2017).
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CSU members were much more skeptical and critical about Merkel’s 
immigration policy (e.g. Marcus Söder or Alexander Dobrindt), who spo-
ke about it ruthlessly during the Party’s congresses (Scholz, Werkhaeuser, 
Matzke, 2016). The most ardent, leading opponent of the Chancellor’s 
migration policy, famous for his controversial statements and actions, was 
Horst Seehofer. Among other things, he opposed Merkel and the federal 
government’s position and supported the immigration policy of Hunga-
rian Prime Minister Victor Orbán, demanding the closure of German bor-
ders for immigrants, and threatening that he would file a complaint with 
the Federal Constitutional Court should the ‘open-door’ policy continue. 
In connection with the upcoming parliamentary elections, he also spoke 
about the possibility of running for the post of Chancellor as the candidate 
of all the Christian Democrats. At the end of 2016, however, he changed 
his mind and supported Merkel’s candidacy for this position. The Chair-
man of the CSU and, at the same time, the Prime Minister of Bavaria tried 
to use the immigration crisis to strengthen his own position in the region 
(admittedly, he remained the Party Chairman, but his position in the CSU 
and public support in Bavaria weakened, and he eventually resigned as 
Bavarian Prime Minister in March 201832) and in the coalition (at this he 
was successful, because he became the Minister of Internal Affairs in the 
new federal government) (Kabinett…, 2018).
Despite criticism from both CDU and CSU members, Angela Merkel 
managed to defend her vision of managing the immigration crisis. Witho-
ut giving up the ‘open-door’ policy and forcing their own solutions, she 
convinced both the Christian Democrats and the majority of voters sup-
porting the Christian Democrats that Germany schaffen das [does that].33 
Although the result in 2017 was worse than that in the elections four years 
earlier, the Christian Democrats still enjoyed the strongest support among 
German parties (39.4%) (Bundestagswahl 2017…, 2017), which meant 
that Merkel could be elected Chancellor for the fourth time and continue 
to exert a strong impact on Germany’s immigration policy.
32 According to a poll conducted in February 2018 by the Civey Institute for the 
Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, 2/3 of the Bavarians surveyed wanted Seehofer to 
retire politically (CSU-Chef: Mehrheit der Bayern…, 2018). The office of Prime Min-
ister of Bavaria (in March 2018) and of the Chairman of the CSU (in January 2019) 
was taken by the former Bavarian Minister of Finance, Marcus Söder.
33 People who were dissatisfied with the Chancellor’s policy towards refugees, 
mainly voted for the Alternative for Germany, which won 94 seats in the Bundestag 
(12.6% of votes), becoming the third force there.
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Polityka chadecji w obliczu napływu syryjskich imigrantów do Republiki 
Federalnej Niemiec (2015–2017) 
 
Streszczenie
Celem artykułu było przybliżenie najczęściej omawianych działań podjętych 
przez kanclerz A. Merkel w celu powstrzymania wzmożonej imigracji Syryjczyków 
do RFN. Zaproponowane przez A. Merkel rozwiązania ukazane zostały w kontekście 
reakcji członków CDU oraz CSU na nie. Polityka kanclerz oraz obu niemieckich 
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partii chadeckich i ich przedstawicieli ukazana została na tle krytycznej dyskusji do-
tyczącej politycznych kosztów, jakie związane są z przyjęciem tak wielkiej liczby 
cudzoziemców. Poruszone zostały zatem m.in. kwestie dotyczące pozycji A. Merkel 
na niemieckiej scenie politycznej oraz wpływu „Willkommenspolitik” na wyniki wy-
borów do Bundestagu w 2017 r.
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